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Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution
The books our children read in public schools and the subjects they are
taught are increasingly becoming the focus of heated courtroom controversies.'
School boards claim absolute discretion; teachers, parents, and students challenge
the boards' decisionmaking authority on first amendment grounds. The courts are
grappling with these conflicting interests and with the underlying tension be-
tween individual rights and majoritarian decisionmaking in the public schools.
This Note suggests that the public school student's first amendment right to
receive information, and the teacher's right to communicate are substantial rights
warranting protection through judicial review of school board decisionmaking.
After examining the leading cases in this area, the Note discusses the state's
interest in retaining control of public education. In Part 111, the Note suggests
that the first amendment is generally applicable to the public schools, despite the
difficulty of applying traditional first amendment analysis in this context. It then
considers the student's right to know, the teacher's right to free expression, and
the justifiable limits on those rights imposed by the exigencies of public educa-
tion. Building upon these competing interests, the Note proposes a standard for
judicial review that would sustain school board decisions when justified by
reasonable educational policy, and concludes by applying this standard to seven
illustrative cases.
I. THE CASES
Within the last decade, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits have all considered how, if at all, the Constitution limits a school
board's authority to select, remove, or prohibit the assignment of textbooks,
library books, and other printed materials for classroom use. The courts so far
have reached uneven and contradictory conclusions based upon incomplete and
unsatisfactory reasoning.
In Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board, I the board,
responding to parental complaints about junior high school students' access in
school to Piri Thomas's Down These Mean Streets, a graphic novel about life in
Spanish Harlem, placed the book on a limited access shelf where students could
obtain it only if their parents borrowed the book for them. 3 An association of
presidents of parent-teacher organizations, parents, teachers, and students chal-
lenged this action in federal district court, asserting a violation of the first
1. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School
Bd. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), appeal pending, No. 79-7676 (2d Cir.
Feb. 6, 1980); Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal pending, No.
79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
2. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
3. This was a compromise solution, reached after the board's initial decision to remove the
book altogether. Id. at 290.
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amendment rights of the parents, children, and teachers. 4  The district court
dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed. Since the board had not prohibited the book's discussion in class or
assignment as outside reading, and parents could borrow the book for their chil-
dren, the court found only a "minuscule" intrusion on any first amendment
constitutional rights.5 It reasoned that a book, having once been shelved in a
school library, could "be removed by the same authority which was empowered
[by statute] to make the selection in the first place" without raising a constitu-
tional issue. 6
Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this
reasoning in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District.' In Minarcini, the
plaintiff high school students, through their parents, claimed that the school
board's schoolbook decisionmaking had violated their first and fourteenth
amendment rights. The board had removed Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle and
Joseph Heller's Catch-22 from the school library, rejected faculty recommenda-
tions that it authorize Catch-22 and Vonnegut's God Bless You, Mr. Rosevater
as library books or textbooks, and passed resolutions limiting discussion of all
three in class and their use as supplementary reading.8 The district court found
these actions constitutional. 9
The court of appeals, noting that the removal had been ordered because
individual board members found the books "objectionable in content," found no
"explanation of the Board's action which is neutral in First Amendment
terms."" 0  It reasoned that neither the state nor the school board, once having
created for students the privilege of a high school library, "could place condi-
tions on [its use] which were related solely to the social or political tastes of
school board members." I Although the books could be removed for a variety
of practical reasons, such as lack of shelf space or wear and tear, their removal
because their content "occasioned ... displeasure or disapproval" 12 impermis-
sibly infringed the student's first amendment "right to know." 13 The court
4. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id. at 289.
5. Id. at 292.
6. Id. at 293. Judge Mulligan stopped short of articulating a standard of absolute school board
discretion over book removal: "To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents a
constitutional issue, particularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or
thought, is a proposition we cannot accept." Id. (emphasis added). It is reasonable to assume, then,
that the court envisioned some circumstances that would constitute such curtailment. Unfortunately, it
made no attempt to analyze what the elements of unconstitutional school board decisionmaking would
be, and what standard courts should apply in evaluating the decisionmaking process itself.
7. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
8. Id. at 579.
9. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
10. 541 F.2d at 582.
11. Id. The court was troubled by the potential burden upon classroom discussion and not
reassured by the books' availability elsewhere. It referred to the library as a "forum for silent
speech," and a "mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas," id. at 582-83, concepts of
traditional first amendment analysis that are of limited applicability in the public school context.
12. Id. at 581.
13. Id. at 583. See also notes 74-113 and accompanying text infra.
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accordingly remanded to the district court with directions to order the reshelving
of the books.
14
In a 1979 decision, Cary v. Board of Education, 15 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit attempted to establish the limits of school board authority to
override high school teachers' selection of literature for their reading lists. The
plaintiffs, teachers of eleventh and twelfth grade elective language arts classes,
had submitted for approval a list of 1,285 books, ten of which the school board
ordered removed. 16  The teachers admitted that the school board had the power
to change the curriculum and presumably to cancel the course itself. 17  They
argued, however, that the board, having approved the course, could not impose
restrictions " 'based upon the personal predilections of members of the school
board' " without violating teachers' rights of academic freedom. 18 The court
disagreed, upholding the school board's action. 19 It recognized that first
amendment protection of freedom of expression had some "carryover ... to
teachers' expressions in the context of course work and classroom teaching," 20
but found that the school board, as the legitimate transmitter of community val-
ues and as the guardian of "the collective will of those whose children are being
educated and who are paying the costs, . . . was acting within its rights in
omitting the books, even though the decision was a political one influenced by
the personal views of the members." 21 The court thus concluded in effect that
the school board members were within their rights in excluding schoolbooks
according to " 'personal predilections.' "22
In all three of these cases the courts confronted the same dilemma: by estab-
lishing public schools and authorizing school boards to prescribe curricula and
select schoolbooks, the states require their delegates to engage in the type of
content-based regulation of expression that the first amendment seems to pro-
hibit.2 ' Although according to traditional first amendment principles "govern-
14. Id. at 584. The court affirmed the district court's finding that procedural due process re-
quirements had been satisfied, and that the actions of the board were not "arbitrary and capricious."
15. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
16. The banned volumes, all of which had been used in previous years, were: A. Burgess, A
Clockwork Orange; W. Blatty, The Exorcist; M. Ehrlich, The Reincarnation of Peter Proud; D.
Allen, New American Poetry; L. Ferlinghetti, Starting from San Francisco; W. Burroughs & A.
Ginsberg, The Yage Letters; L. Ferlinghetti, Coney Island of the Mind; A. Ginsberg, Kaddish and
Other Poems; F. O'Hara, Lunch Poems; I. Levin, Rosemary's Baby.
The board, which gave no reasons for its decision, made no effort to prohibit discussion of the
books. The parties stipulated that "the books were not obscene, no systematic effort had been made
to exclude any particular system of thought or philosophy, and a 'constitutionally proper decision-
maker' could decide these books were proper for high school language arts classes." Id. at 538.
17. Id. at 542.
18. Id. at 542-43.
19. While the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, it rejected the lower court's
conclusion that the teachers had waived their constitutional rights concerning book assignments by
the terms of their collective bargaining agreement. 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd, 598
F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
20. 598 F.2d at 543.
21. Id. at 543-44.
22. Id. at 544.
23. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). For a fuller discussion of
the impact of educational decisionmaking on first amendment analysis, see section IV.A. infra.
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ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content," 24 school boards must base their decisions to
acquire or reject schoolbooks on precisely those criteria. Schools cannot teach all
there is to learn; school boards must choose the subjects they wish to transmit
and select those books which will accomplish this purpose. None of the courts
addressed this paradox directly. The Minarcini court, in holding the school
board's action unconstitutional merely because it was content-based, failed to
recognize the legitimacy and necessity of making educational decisions on the
basis of what is being taught. In contrast, the Cary and Presidents Council
courts concluded that the need for content-based regulation makes the first
amendment inapplicable in the classroom, overlooking the first amendment in-
terests of students and teachers. Neither approach appropriately reconciles the
values of education and free expression with state regulation of public education.
II. THE NATURE OF STATE REGULATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Public schooling in the United States has traditionally been the responsibil-
ity of the states, 25 typically provided for in their constitutions 6 and administered
through complex and comprehensive laws. 2 7 School systems are by nature
majoritarian, directed by school boards either directly or indirectly chosen by
democratic process, and answerable to the people they represent.2 8 In this way
the community theoretically is able to maintain a school system that reflects its
values and particular needs. 29
The states have compelling reasons to exercise substantial control over the
school systems, and over their curricula in particular. These interests are closely
related to perhaps the most basic first amendment value: the protection of "the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'gov-
ern.' "30 To protect that freedom, the states attempt to ensure that their citi-
24. Id. at 95.
25. The provision of public education has been fairly described as "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments ... required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
26. State constitutions may require the establishment and maintenance of the public schools
themselves. See, e.g., N.J. Const. art. 8, § 4, 1; N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 1. Some states make more
general constitutional provision for the encouragement of education. See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. 8, §
I; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2.
27. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law (McKinney 1969). See also Project, Education and the Law:
State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1374, 1375-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Project].
28. For comprehensive discussions of school board structure and the delegation of educational
authority, see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Goldstein, School Board Authority]; Project, supra note 27, at 1375-81.
29. For a critique of government control of history schoolbook selection in the primary and
secondary schools, arguing that school boards traditionally have opted for texts depicting a distorted,
homogenized view of American society, see F. FitzGerald, America Revised: History Schoolbooks in
the Twentieth Century (1979).
30. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 [hereinafter
cited as Meiklejohn, First Amendment]. In a sense, then, by deferring to first amendment values, the
state is pursuing its own long-term best interests.
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zens will be at least minimally equipped to function as autonomous, productive
adults in a self-governing society, 3 ' and to defend the welfare of their chil-
dren.3 2  They thus require that children be educated for a certain number of
years,3 3 that instruction be provided by qualified, licensed teachers,3 4 and that
the curriculum include whatever courses of study each state deems essential for
the students' "intellectual, moral, and social development." 35
Although state and local school boards generally have broad discretion to
administer the schools and to establish curricula,36 parents frequently can bring
about changes in schoolbook policies through the exertion of political force
within the community. 37 This is not surprising, since the authority of the
boards, whether elected or legislatively created, ultimately depends upon their
31. See Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 321, 344-45 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Garvey, First Amendment].
32. It has long been established that the state may restrict even constitutionally protected ex-
pression in order to prevent harm to minor children. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); notes 78-87 and accompanying text infra.
33. See Project, supra note 27, at 1386-99.
The state may not compel parents to use the public as opposed to private schools. See Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Indeed, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), suggests
that states may not always compel "in school" attendance. In that case the Court held that Amish
parents who withdrew their children from public school after eighth grade to insure free exercise of
their religion could not be punished for violating a state compulsory education law. Yoder may, in
fact, stand for the same parental right of choice regarding education upheld in Pierce, since the Court
in effect recognized the Amish lifestyle as "leaming-by-doing"-a form of bona fide home instruc-
tion. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to Have One's Child
Excused from Objectionable Instruction? 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 871, 902 (1977); Moskowitz, Parental
Rights and State Education, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 623, 630-36 (1975).
34. Project, supra note 27, at 1378-79.
35. Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1176, 1186-87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Teach]. See also Project, supra note 27, at
1378-80; Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove
High School Text and Library Books, 52 St. John's L. Rev. 457, 459 n.13 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as First Amendment Limitations].
Some elements of indoctrination by the school system are permissible. Many states require by
statute that students be taught American history and government. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Slat, Ann. §
15-1021 (West 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 340.361-.362 (West 1976). Some also require
instruction concerning capitalism. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 233.064 (Harrison 1977); Utah Code
Ann. § 53-14-7.5 (Supp. 1979); First Amendment Limitations, supra, at 459 n.13. See also Kamen.
shine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1104,
1135-36 & nn.106-10 (1979). There is ample evidence that the reasonable implementation of the
educational goals reflected in these statutes-i.e., the fostering of good citizenship and patriotism-
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's view of freedom of thought and expression in the public
schools. See e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); cf. Palmer v.
Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1026 (1980). But it is
equally clear from Barnette that the schools may not go too far and attempt the "coercive elimination
of dissent." 319 U.S. at 641.
36. See sources collected in notes 27-28 supra.
37. Parental complaints to school board officials often succeed in effecting the removal of
books. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D.
Vt. 1979) (parents successfully used school board procedure to request review of book they wished
removed), appeal pending, No. 79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978) (parent's complaint about language in a poem
caused anthology to be withdrawn from school library); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973
(7th Cir. 1974) (teacher dismissed after parental complaints about brochures distributed to class con-
taining 'poem advocating free love and drugs), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
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responsiveness to local needs. At a more immediate level, board members, being
citizens, taxpayers, and often parents themselves,3 8 are likely to share the con-
cerns and attitudes of the community they represent, and may therefore be espe-
cially sensitive to matters generating controversy among local parents. 39
When a parent, or local board member, protests the use of a book, or
asserts that "a particular viewpoint conflicts with accepted community val-
ues," 0 the board as a whole may act as the representative of that community
interest. In this way, responsive majoritarian public education helps to retain a
region's local character, maintain national diversity, and pass along to the young
the values and beliefs of their society. It is only when this agency of the state
seeks by majority rule to abridge interests that the Constitution puts above the
vote that the courts may intervene in school board decisionmaking. In the next
section this Note examines the impact of individual first amendment rights on
public school schoolbook controversies.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON STATE REGULATION
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. The First Amendment in the Schools
When parents, teachers, and students challenge the schoolbook policies of
the public school system, they invariably invoke the first amendment as one
source of their rights.4 1 The plain language of the amendment 42 is sufficiently
unambiguous to create a strong presumption against any state regulation of ex-
38. See Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1356 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein, Asserted
Right]; Goldstein, School Board Authority, supra note 28, at 384-86; Van Alstyne, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L. J. 841, 855-58; Milliken v. Green, 389
Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457, 483 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. The desirability of this state of affairs depends on one's view of the primary role of public
elementary and secondary education. If public education is simply a passive transmitter to the child
of the collected, valued knowledge and mores of the community, this "parochial" attitude is entirely
appropriate-restrained by whatever limitations the Constitution places on state action.
40. Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1054 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Developments].
41. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, District 25 v.
Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), appeal pending,
No. 79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980); Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
appeal pending, No. 79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
Although the first amendment seems a logical source of protection for academic freedom, see
Developments, supra note 40 at 1053, one commentator has suggested that academic freedom may
"[m]ore properly" be derived "from the 'emanations' of a series of constitutional provisions,"
including first amendment freedom of expression and freedom of religion, and the fourteenth
amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of
Expression 612-13 (1970). See also Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modem Dress, 27 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 522, 524-26 (1960).
42. "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. .
U.S. Const., amend. 1.
1980] SCHOOLBOOKS 1097
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
pression.4  However, the first amendment does not protect all expression; 44 it
safeguards the expressions that are necessary for the survival of basic first
amendment values.4 5 To determine whether the first amendment is applicable to
schoolbook controversies, then, one must first identify these core values and
determine whether and to what extent their preservation requires the protection of
expression within the public schools.
Although there is no consensus concerning the core values of the first
amendment, 46 there are two major schools of thought on the subject. The first,
notably advocated by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, 47 views the first amend-
ment as a limit only upon government regulation of "public speech." Public
speech as a classification is itself susceptible to several interpretations, ranging
from the narrowest concept of purely political speech 48 to a broader definition
embracing all expression that informs political judgments. 49  This view of free-
dom of expression under the first amendment is essentially utilitarian, justifying
restraints on government regulation to protect the process of democratic govern-
ment.
5 0
The second approach identifies as a core value of the first amendment
this political concern for self-government and at the same time emphasizes a
43. The first amendment is made applicable to action by the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale L.J. 1105, 1109 (1979).
44. There are, of course, forms of "expression" that lie outside the protective sphere of the
first amendment. This Note is not concerned with attempts to incorporate into the public school
curriculum or libraries "fighting words," see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972),
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); "obscenity," see Miller v. Califomia,
413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); or speech that "incit[es] or
produc[es] imminent lawless action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). When the
state may legitimately restrict adults with regard to such forms of expression, a fortiori it may
prohibit children's exposure to them. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld state regulation of even
constitutionally protected conduct or expression when motivated by the state's interest in safeguarding
the welfare of minor children. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
45. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5, 9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Speech].
46. See, e.g., T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 6-7; A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation
to Self-Government 88-89, 106-07 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Meiklejohn, Free Speech]; BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 302-03 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 26-28 (1971); Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 30, at 255-57, 263.
47. See sources cited in notes 30 & 46 supra.
48. See Bork, supra note 46, at 26-27. Bork argues that "[flreedom of non-political speech
rests, as does freedom for other valuable forms of behavior, upon the enlightenment of society and
its elected representatives." Id. at 28.
49. See BeVier, supra note 46, at 302-03; Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 30, at 263.
50. Professor Wellington has criticized this view for overlooking the inherent difficulty in mak-
ing nice distinctions between "public" and "nonpublic" speech. Wellington, supra note 43, at I I 11.
Indeed, Professor Meiklejohn himself had difficulty maintaining a narrow definition of political
speech, as can be seen by comparing his narrow ambit of public speech protection in Free Speech,
supra note 46, written in 1948, and his 1961 views in First Amendment, supra note 30, which
concluded that "the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems, 'because they will
be called upon to vote.'" Id. at 263 (quoting Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 16). Professor Meiklejohn's "public speech" protection ultimately embraced
"[e]ducation, in all its phases ... [t]he achievements of philosophy and the sciences ... [I]iterature
and the arts ... [and] [p]ublic discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information
and opinion bearing on those issues .... Id. at 257.
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broader concern for individual fulfillment through free expression. This view,
which has been elaborated principally by Professor Thomas Emerson, stresses
the essential role played by free expression in advancing knowledge, in permit-
ting participation in political and cultural decisionmaking, and in "achieving a
more adaptable and hence a more stable community, [and] maintaining the pre-
carious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 51 It thus
looks not only to utilitarian values of benefit to society at large, but also to
overtly individualistic values of personal development.5 2
Taken together, these different values can be seen as embodying a funda-
mental first amendment concern with the development and preservation of an
"educated citizenry," 11 a core value different from Professor Meiklejohn's "in-
formed electorate" but its necessary antecedent. Thus, when public school stu-
dents, teachers, and parents assert the "right to know" against school board
restrictions of educational expression, the basis of their claims lies in the con-
stitutional value of an educated citizenry.
The protection of this core value requires that courts recognize the public
school student's right to receive educational information and the teacher's cor-
relative right to impart such information. Neither of these first amendment rights
is absolute, as suggested later in this Note, but both must be accorded judicial
protection against abuses by school board authorities.
Although Supreme Court decisions have not yet recognized the rights to
receive and impart educational information, the Court has long acknowledged the
first amendment's protection of "academic freedom." 14 In Keyishian v. Board
of Regents,55 the Court invalidated a New York statute imposing a loyalty pro-
gram on public employees, including teachers in the public schools and univer-
sities. Although the statute was invalidated on grounds of vagueness and over-
51. T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 6-7. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 Tex.
L. Rev. 505, 512-15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Right to Know].
52. See Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy and the Law, 12 Gonz. L.
Rev. 1, 3-8 (1976).
53. See Right to Know, supra note 51, at 514; Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 30, at
263. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
54. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.)
("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment."). For an excellent analysis of the legal implications
and scope of academic freedom in higher education in the United States, see T. Emerson, supra note
41, at 593-626.
Academic freedom as commonly understood means freedom from government intervention in the
schools. Even judicial intervention at the instance of parents and teachers sets troubling precedents
for a "governmental presence in the academic world [that] would be repressive and destructive rather
than liberating." T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 615. Cf. Presidents Council, District 25 v. Commu-
nity School Bd., 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.) ("Academic freedom is scarcely fostered by the
intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for the community
of scholars."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
Whatever the risk of inviting the courts into the academic world, they serve as an essential
check on arbitrary state regulation of public education and may strike down policies that infringe the
constitutional rights of children, parents, and teachers.
55. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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breadth, Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, observed that "[olur Nation
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,[ 56] which is of tran-
scendent value to all of us .... That freedom is .. .a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom." 57 The Court was concerned that laws inhibiting the extracur-
ricular expressions of faculty members would also chill the free exercise of the
intellectual skills for which they were hired, and lead finally to state-imposed
intellectual and ideological conformity. 58 The Keyishian majority anticipated
that the chilling of a teacher's expression outside the classroom might lead to the
inhibition of discussion within the classroom itself. This inhibition, with its at-
tendant constraint on the free exchange of ideas, might eventually result in the
coercion of uniform beliefs within the public education system, disapproved
twenty-five years earlier in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette.59
In its most recent statement on the role of the first amendment in the public
school system, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 0
the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the minor student's first amend-
ment right to freedom of expression in the classroom. The student petitioners
filed complaints, through their fathers, seeking to enjoin the school and district
administrator from disciplining students who wore black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War.6 1 The Court found that the school's regulation unconstitutionally
infringed the students' right to "silent speech," because there was no showing
either that their conduct "materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d] substan-
56. See notes 54 supra & 88 infra.
57. 385 U.S. at 603.
On the classroom as a marketplace of ideas, see text accompanying notes 88-90 infra.
58. Justice.Brennan explained: "It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as
possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in this intricate
machinery.... The result must be to stifle 'that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought
especially to cultivate and practice.'" 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
59. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although the claim in Barnette was one of infringement of religious
belief by compelling salute of the flag in violation of the proscription of worship of "graven im-
ages,"an element of the faith of Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court's opinion went beyond the religious
claim and held that state compulsion to declare any belief "invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." Id. at 642. Cf. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1972)
(teacher cannot be compelled to take part in flag salute), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
The danger of coerced conformity of belief is equally serious when the teacher, rather than the
school authorities, is the source of indoctrination:
[T]eachers cannot be allowed to patrol the precincts of radical thought with the unrelenting
goal of indoctrination .... When a teacher is only content if he persuades his students that
his values and only his values ought to be their values, then it is not unreasonable to expect
the state to protect impressionable children from such dogmatism.
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 11042 (1972). See
notes 125-31 and accompanying text infra.
60. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
61. The school had adopted a policy forbidding any student wearing an armband to attend
school. The district court had dismissed the complaint, holding the regulation to be a "reasonable"
measure aimed at maintenance of school discipline. 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The court
of appeals, en bane, divided evenly and affirmed without opinion. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967),
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tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" or that the school administration
could "reasonably have [been] led . . . to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities." 62 Justice Fortas declared:
[S]tate operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students
in school as well as out of school are persons under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In
our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved.
63
Students, then, retain some constitutional rights within the public schools
that the state may not suppress without inviting judicial intervention. Tinker,
Barnette, and Keyishian illustrate the Court's willingness to review state regula-
tion of public education when it trenches upon important first amendment rights
of academic freedom and extracurricular freedom of expression and belief. They
shed little light, however, on the limitations, if any, that the right to free ex-
pression and the right to receive information place on state control of school
curricula or materials. Although the Court has not yet addressed this question
directly, Epperson v. Arkansas provides glimmerings of one possible answer.
64
In Epperson, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching of evolu-
tion in Arkansas public schools 6 5 as violative of the establishment clause
66 of
the first amendment. The trial court had invalidated the statute on first amend-
ment academic freedom grounds," but its judgment was reversed by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, which found the statute to be a "valid exercise of the state's
power to specify the curriculum in its public schools." 68 The United States
Supreme Court again reversed, basing its decision on religious, not academic,
freedom. Nonetheless, Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, observed more
broadly that "[o]ur courts . . . have not failed to apply the First Amendment's
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 513, 514
(1969).
63. Id. at 511. This passage has been cited in support of the proposition that the "marketplace
of ideas" model, prohibiting "arbitrary indoctrination," is constitutionally required in the public
school system as well as in institutions of higher education. See Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 857;
notes 89-90 infra.
64. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
65. The statute made it unlawful:
for any teacher ... in any ... [educational] institution of the State, which is supported in
whole or in part from public funds ... to teach the theory or doctrine that mahkind as-
cended or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall be unlawful for any
teacher, textbook commission or other authority exercising the power to select textbooks for
above mentioned educational institutions to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook
that teaches [that] doctrine ....
Initiated Act No. 1, Ark. Acts 1929; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1627 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
66. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion...." U.S. Const.,
amend. 1.
67. T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 605.
68. State v. Epperson, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967).
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mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental
values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief." 6
Some indication of the nature of this first amendment limit on state control
over the content of public education may be gleaned from the somewhat enig-
matic concurring opinion of Justice Black. Although he believed the Arkansas
statute to be unconstitutionally vague, Justice Black could imagine "no reason
...why a State is without power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools." 70 Even he
conceded, however, that there are some restrictions that no state can impose on
its teachers. 71 Once the state decides to include a particular subject in its cur-
riculum, the teacher cannot be compelled to endorse or present one particular
viewpoint to the exclusion of all others. 71 Justice Stewart reached a similar
conclusion, stating that the criminal punishment of the teaching of certain points
of view "would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication con-
tained in the First Amendment." 73
Thus, for Justices Stewart and Black at least, some degree of first amend-
ment protection extends to the expression of teachers at work in public school
classrooms. Unfortunately, neither undertook any deeper exploration of the ex-
tent to which the first amendment restrains the state's power to control what its
teachers teach. In the sections that follow, this Note seeks to show that the
teacher's right to speak in the classroom is the necessary complement of the
public school student's right to receive educational information.
69. 393 U.S. at 104. The majority's partial reliance on traditional principles of academic free-
dom led Justice Black to protest the Court's headlong leap "into the middle of the very broad
problems involved in federal intrusion into state powers to decide what subjects and schoolbooks it
may wish to use in teaching state pupils." Id. at 110 (Black, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 113.
71. One commentator has suggested that the state may not engage in "arbitrary restrictions on
alternative sources of information or opinion." Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 857. Arbitrary restric-
tions would be those not based on budgetary, time, or space considerations. Thus, any deliberate
attempt to indoctrinate through book selection would be unconstitutional. This analysis is flawed
because such "nonarbitrary" restrictions do not dictate final selection of materials, they merely com-
pel someone to make choices with regard to which books to purchase or retain. Final selection
decisions will be prompted by other considerations, such as content, relevance, timeliness, and need,
See Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1349 n. 183; Garvey, First Amendment, supra note
31, at 327.
72. "It is plain that a state law prohibiting all teaching of human development or biology is
constitutionally quite different from a law that compels a teacher to teach as true only one theory of a
given doctrine." 393 U.S. at Ill (Black, J., concurring).
One commentator has suggested that when the school board wants no presentation of certain
materials, e.g., certain language or ideas in class assignments, the avoidance of apparent "legitimiza-
tion" of such language or ideas is itself a valid educational interest that justifies book restrictions.
See Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1345. However, this Note suggests that when no
prior valid prohibitive policy has been established and a teacher assigns a particular book for a
reasonable educational purpose, the state must prove a reasonable educational policy for prohibiting
its use. See Section IV infra.
73. 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
1102 [Vol. 80:1092
SCHOOLBOOKS
B. The Student's Right to Receive Educational Information
The right of public school students to receive educational information a-to
hear, to read, and to learn-has only recently begun to be defined by the
courts. 75 The right derives from the first amendment right to receive informa-
tion,7 6 which itself is a corollary to the right of free expression, 77 and is critical
to the promotion of an educated citizenry in a free society. While the extent to
which a child, or his or her parents or teachers, can assert the child's right to
receive information in the public schools is at best unclear, courts have generally
concluded that the minor's right to know is more circumscribed than the adult's.
In Ginsberg v. New York, 78 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that made it illegal to sell constitutionally protected salacious materials to
74. The right to receive information furthers both the personal and utilitarian purposes of the
first amendment. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra. However, in view of the immaturity
and relative incapacity of children, their fight to receive information may be viewed principally as a
means to an end: their development into adults capable of the "effective exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms and ... intelligent utilization of the right to vote." San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
75. It is unclear whether a child may assert a right to receive information that neither the state
nor her parent wishes her to receive; but where parent and child act in unison, a number of courts
have recognized such a right under the first amendment. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City
School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (student Ihas right to hear teacher's discussion of
controversial library book and then to "find and read" the book); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ.,
469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273-75 (D.N.H. 1979) (infringement of student's right to receive information
valid only where authorities show substantial interest served by restriction); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978) ("What is at stake here is the
right to read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and language-a valuable fight subject to First
Amendment protection."). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (statute interfered
with "the calling of modem language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowl-
edge, and with the power of parents to control" the education of their child) (emphasis added).
76. See generally Right to Know, supra note 51. The Supreme Court typically has referred to
the right to receive information in the context of challenges to restrictions on speech. See, e.g.,
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Right to Know, supra, at 507-10. However,
several decisions have recognized that this right can also be asserted by the listener, whether or not a
willing speaker is able to assert her right to speak. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[W]here
a speaker exists, ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its reci-
pients both."). Thus, even when the speaker does not or cannot assert a fight to free expression, the
listener may attempt to vindicate the opportunity for reciprocal "communication" between them.
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (scope of speaker-prisoner's rights did not
have to be determined because of clear infringement of recipient's rights).
77. As Justice Brennan, concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General, pointed out:
[T]he protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful.... [T]he right to receive publications is such a funda-
mental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing ad-
dressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Congress may not require addressees to request in writing delivery of
mail from communist countries).
78. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg established "variable obscenity" analysis concerning
minors' access to sexually explicit material that would not be obscene as to adults. Note, Regulation
of Programming Content to Protect Children After Paciflca, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 1377, 1389 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Program Content].
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minors. The Court concluded that the statute did not invade "the area of free-
dom of expression constitutionally secured to minors," 7 and was within the
state's authority to proscribe conduct affecting children that it would be power-
less to prohibit in the case of adults. 80  The statute was not unconstitutional
because it acknowledged the primacy of parental control over childrearing while
it reasonably reflected the legislature's concern for the potential harm that uncon-
trolled exposure to erotica might inflict on children.81
The same concern about unsupervised children gaining access to constitu-
tionally protected but controversial adult material took the Court one step beyond
Ginsberg in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.82 Pacifica upheld the FCC's author-
ity to regulate the airing of "patently offensive" 83 material that was "not
obscene in the constitutional sense" 84 at times when children are likely to be-
listening. Only a plurality concluded that this was a regulation of "form, rather
than . . . content." 85 A majority, however, argued that "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read," 86 and invoked the
protection-of-minors rationale articulated in Ginsberg, to justify the regulation of
expression that is not even variably obscene.
87
It would seem, then, that a child does have a right to receive certain kinds
of information, although that right is limited by parental prerogatives and by the
state's interest in protecting unsupervised children from uncontrolled exposure to
sexually explicit or offensive materials intended for adult consumption. Recogni-
tion of this basic right is a key factor in the analysis of schoolbook controver-
79. 390 U.S. at 637.
80. Id. at 638. See also id. at 708 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that the statute did not affect parental
prerogatives: parents were not prohibited from purchasing the magazines and giving them to their
own children if they desired. Moreover, the statute aided objecting parents in preventing their chil-
dren from coming in contact with such erotic materials. Id. at 639-40.
82. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
83. Id. at 743.
84. Id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The majority in
Pacifica for the first time approved the restriction of children's access to expression that was not
adjudged obscene even as to minors by the variable obscenity test established in Ginsberg, Id. at 767
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, it did not even refer to this theory in reaching its decision. See
Program Content, note 78 supra, at 1395.
85. Id. at 743 n.18.
86. Id. at 749. This rationale tacitly endorsed Judge Leventhal's dissent on the same grounds in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 556 F.2d 9, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Judge
Leventhal's opinion, which Justice Powell cited with approval, 438 U.S. 757 n. I, clearly enunciated
a protectionist rationale and would have sustained the FCC ruling " 'that the language as broadcast
was indecent' " and could be restricted with regard to the time of broadcast. 556 F.2d at 31 (em-
phasis in original). See also note 87 infra.
87. Justice Powell joined the judgment on this ground only. Id. at 755-62 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). He rejected the plurality's views that regulation of
nonobscene but "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities," id. at
743, was control of "form, rather than ... content," id. at 743 n.18, and that such expression was
less valuable to society and less deserving of frst amendment protection than other expressions. Id.
at 747. This approach was first articulated by Justice Stevens in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976), when a plurality of the Court recognized a category of expression
outside the sphere of "ideas of social and political significance." See Program Content, note 78
supra, at 1384-85.
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sies, although somewhat different limits on the right may be found where educa-
tional rather than sexual material is concerned.
Courts dealing with the right to receive information in the context of higher
education have evolved a "marketplace of ideas" model as the best means of
protecting the first amendment value of an educated citizenry as well as the
traditional ideal of academic freedom.8 8 This model is particularly apt within
the college or university community, where young adults attempt through critical
and creative analysis to increase the universe of what is known. It may be of
questionable applicability in primary and secondary public schools, where attend-
ance is compulsory and students have little control over their exposure to course
content.89 Some sources suggest that this marketplace of ideas model should
also obtain in the public schools; 91 minor students, however, lack the capacity to
participate fully as buyers in that marketplace. Moreover, the public school is
not a traditional public forum. 91 Thus, the state may seek to persuade, even
reasonably to indoctrinate, its young people to conform to societal values and
norms, although it must stop short of imposing totalitarian control.
92
The state's power to regulate expression is most severely limited when that
expression takes place in a "public forum."" Aside from traditional public
88. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The popular concep-
tion in the United States of "academic freedom," see also note 54 supra, thought to emerge from the
first amendment guarantees of free speech, inaccurately reflects the reality of public education.
89. "The secondary school more clearly than the college or university acts in loco parentis with
respect to minors .... Most parents, students, school boards, and members of the community
usually expect the secondary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching the
best that is known and thought in the world, training by established techniques and, to some extent at
least, indoctrinating in the mores of the surrounding society." Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387,
1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (lst Cir. 1971). See Developments, supra note 40, at 1051;
Right to Teach, supra note 35, at 1179-80, 1184; Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High
School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1032, 1032-33 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Nahmod, Controversy]; Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1350-51; Note,
Academic Freedom in the High School Classroom, 15 J. Fain. L. 706, 724 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Academic Freedom].
90. But see Right to Teach, supra note 35 at 1180-82, where the author suggests that the
-marketplace of ideas" model may now be applicable to lower education, having been given impetus
by the "open classroom" movement. Several court decisions appear to recognize this possibility.
See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976); Par-
ducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Whether or not this interpretation would
be desirable, these decisions seem to reflect a misconception that originated in Tinker. The Court in
Tinker quoted with approval Justice Brennan's forceful statement that "[tihe classroom is peculiarly
the 'marketplace of ideas"' in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See also
text accompanying notes 55-58 supra. Keyishian, however, concerned the right of a state university
teacher not to be subjected to a loyalty program. Both the facts that Keyishian was a university
teacher and that the first amendment claim did not relate to conduct in the classroom call into
question the Tinker Court's invocation of the "marketplace of ideas" model in the context of a
public school. Moreover, it is important to remember that Tinker itself addressed only student expres-
sion, invalidating school restrictions on nondisruptive symbolic student speech. It did not purport to
establish a student's right to receive information and a teacher's reciprocal right of free expression in
the classroom. See Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1350-55.
91. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. I; L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 689-90 (1978); notes 93-97 and accompanying text infra.
92. See Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the
First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 874-75 (1979).
93. The term "public forum" was introduced by Professor Kalven, see Kalven, supra note 91,
at 11-12. Professor Tribe has characterized the public forum as "constitutional shorthand for the
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meeting places such as parks, sidewalks, and public streets, which must be
employed as public forums, 9 4 facilities such as municipal theatres or meeting
houses become public forums when they are dedicated by the state to "the ex-
change of views among members of the public." 95 The critical question is
whether such facilities were created for the primary purpose of public access and
communication. Public schools traditionally have not been deemed to come
within this definition: they are created not for public interchange but for closely
regulated and structured transmission of particular ideas and skills. There is no
clear intent to dedicate the public school to unrestricted public access and com-
munication.9" The state, then, has more leeway to limit expression, "to pre-
serve such tranquility as the facilit[y's] central purpose requires," than would
obtain in the case of a true public forum.
9 7
The analysis of the child's first amendment right to know is further compli-
cated because the state can interfere with that right in two ways. First, the state
may regulate speech by silencing a teacher in some circumstances9" or by re-
moving a book from the library. Second, it may itself refuse to speak, by decid-
ing not to teach certain subjects or purchase certain books. In traditional first
amendment jurisprudence only the regulation of speech, not the refusal to speak
at all, is thought to raise a constitutional issue. 99 There is, however, both
proposition that, in addition to its usual obligation of content-neutrality (an obligation that exists
whether or not a public forum is involved), government cannot regulate speech-related conduct in
such places except in narrow ways shown to be necessary to serve significant governmental in-
terests." L. Tribe, supra note 91, at 689 (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 690.
95. Id. at 689-90.
96. Professor Tribe calls such facilities as schools and libraries "semi-public forums" -neither
private property nor public facilities "created primarily for public interchange." Id. at 690; Yudof,
supra note 92, at 884-88. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (no constitutional
principle exists "that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or
operated by the Government, then that place becomes a 'public forum' for purposes of the First
Amendment").
97. Id. Thus the state is not required to tolerate behavior, whether by speech or action, that
unduly interferes with the effective operation of its public schools. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) ("conduct ... which ... materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is ... not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech"), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972) (conduct creating noise may be excluded from public property adjacent to school in session),
with Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949) (free speech "best serve[s] its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger"). Professor Yudof suggests, however, that a total prohibition of outside
influences is inconsistent with educational purposes and concludes that outside individuals and groups
should be able to assert a qualified right of access to the public schools. Yudof, supra note 92, at
885.
98. See section III. C. infra.
99. See Tribe, supra note 91, at 580-84; see also note 72 and accompanying text supra.
At the time this Note was set in print, the Supreme Court had never explicitly held that the first
amendment conferred on the public a right of access to governmental sources of information. The
Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980),
suggests a willingness to do so, at least with regard to criminal trials. Although there was no
majority opinion for the Court, seven Justices, each endorsing a first amendment right of public
access in this context, voted to reverse a state judge's order closing a criminal trial to the press and
the public. Justice Powell took no part in this decision, but his concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979), suggests there may be an eighth vote favoring this view.
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reason and precedent for bringing the state as unwilling speaker within the scope
of the first amendment.'
00
Although the state has considerable latitude in directing the public schools
and determining the content of public education,' 0 ' protection of fundamental
first amendment values-utilitarian and individual-requires it to refrain from
certain types of selective silence that may be tantamount to active indoctrination.
It is this realization that led the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC .02
to uphold the constitutionality of the FCC's "fairness doctrine," which requires
even unwilling licensed broadcasters to provide air time for opposing viewpoints
on controversial subjects. Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that
the fairness doctrine is justified and even required by the first amendment,
whose purpose, he pointed out, is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a pri-
vate licensee . " Thus, the Court acknowledged for the first time that
there are instances when the public's first amendment right to receive informa-
tion can require even the unwilling speaker to speak.'
0 4
Even if the marketplace of ideas principle is not fully applicable to lower
levels of schooling, the principles set out in Red Lion are certainly relevant to
Richmond may herald a new receptivity by the Court to a vision of the first amendment that, in
certain circumstances, compels an unwilling governmental source of information to "speak" because
of the public's right to "listen." It should be noted, however, that Richmond is not a clear mandate
for a general right of access. The Justices emphasized the "'presumption of openness [that] inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." 100 S. Ct. at 2825 (Burger, C.J.,
joined by White and Stevens, JJ.). See also id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 2834 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Thus, it would be premature to assume that the same right of access can
automatically be applied to other contexts which do not share this tradition of publicity.
100. Although it is reasonable to characterize books and teachers as willing-and restrictive
school boards as unwilling-speakers, it is not necessary to do so to raise the constitutional issue.
The student's first amendment right to receive information and the first amendment values of an
educated citizenry independently restrain school board authority to regulate schoolbooks. See Section
Ill. A. supra.
101. See section II supra. But see Emerson, Symposium-The First Amendment and the Right
to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 8 (1976) (suggesting that
the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), should have acknowledged that "in the field
of education, where the government has a virtual monopoly, certain kinds of curriculum restrictions
seem to run afoul of the right to know").
102. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
103. Id. at 390.
104. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), at first glance seems
conclusively to preclude any "'right" of access to non-broadcast media. In Tornillo, the state at-
tempted to legislate a right of access to the privately owned press. The Court unanimously rejected
this abridgment of the freedom of the press to make editorial judgments without governmental inter-
ference. As Chief Justice Burger explained, "'governmental coercion [of newspapers] at once brings
about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on
that Amendment developed over the years." Id. at 254. The "express provision" to which the Court
referred, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of the Press," U.S. Const.,
amend. I, prevents "supplant[ing] private control of the press with the heavy hand of government
intrusion .. " Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring). Without its protection, the "government [might
become] the censor of what the people may read and know." Id.
Tornillo is, thus, of limited value in schoolbook controversies, where the speaker-editor is the
state, and application of a qualified "fairness doctrine" furthers the same goal of minimizing gov-
ernmental interference with the free flow of ideas.
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schoolbook controversies. The fairness doctrine attempts to prevent the creation
of "an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has
denied others the right to use." 105 Obviously, since government controls the
allocation of airwaves through licensing but does not control the establishment of
alternatives in education, the analogy to public schools cannot be stretched too
far. Within the public schools themselves, however, the state has complete edito-
rial control. It broadcasts its chosen educational message to an audience made up
of children. The schools do not utilize a physically limited medium of expres-
sion, but they have neither enough time nor resources to permit all books, or
even books "worth reading," to be read by their students.1 0 6  Choices must be
made, and the school boards will select some books and exclude others. 1 0 7  The
student's right to receive information requires that when the board intentionally
omits material from the school's message, it should have a reason for doing so
consistent with its educational mission. 10 8 When the board's restrictions of ex-
pression are not motivated by educational judgment, students, parents, and
teachers should be able to turn to the courts for relief.
A final paradox concerning the student's right to know is presented by the
"captive audience" status sometimes attributed to public school students."t '
105. 395 U.S. at 391.
106. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 122
(1973) ("With broadcasting, where the available means of communication are limited in both space
and time, the admonition of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn that '[w]hat is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said' is peculiarly appropriate. Politi-
cal Freedom 26 (1948).").
107. This Note does not, therefore, advocate the rigid imposition on the schools of the "equal
time" type of "fairness doctrine" used in broadcasting. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J.),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). Some commentators, however, have suggested that if, the gov-
ernment is the speaker-educator, the first amendment may require "a fairly balanced exposition of
various relevant theories and points of view, and of alternatives open for action." Emerson & Haber,
supra note 41, at 527. The authors, referring to basic curricular, rather than book, choices, would
consider the extent to which the state's audience was denied access to alternative and opposing views
as well as the age and relative maturity of its members before imposing a rigid balance requirement.
In a public school, children make up the audience, and the state controls the content of the message.
Such considerations might impose a higher degree of obligation on the public schools with regard to
"fairness" than would obtain in other areas of government communication. Id. at 527-28.
Similarly, Justices Black and Stewart suggested in Epperson, 393 U.S. at III, 115, that a
teacher must be permitted to present balanced material once the subject matter has been included in
the curriculum. See notes 71-73 supra. See also Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning
and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1479, 1510 (1972); Nahmod,
Controversy, supra note 89, at 1047-50; Right to Teach, supra note 35, at 1186.
108. The principal disadvantage of a rigid "balanced presentation" requirement lies in its cost
in terms of judicial intrusion as a watchdog over the school system. Not only would this have the
practical effect of requiring a factfinding hearing with respect to virtually all school board educational
choices, it would vest final educational decisionmaking authority in the courts, rather than the local
educational authorities, as the state legislatures intended. Comment, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 511, 521
(1977) (courts might be tempted to substitute their own judgments for those of the educational au-
thorities through imposition of the fairness doctrine on school library collections).
109. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971). See also Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (state "may permissibly determine
that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
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Captive audience status is usually invoked to justify governmental limitations on
the freedom of expression in certain places at certain times. 110 Children in
public schools intentionally are subjected to a preselected curriculum in part be-
cause they lack the capacity to assess their own educational needs and make
independent choices. The state makes the selection for them, supplying useful
materials they can comprehend, while protecting them from exposure to poten-
tially harmful dxpression. But while this very dependency justifies state regula-
tion of expression to children II1 it makes them vulnerable to governmental
abuses. Children are incapable of distancing themselves from and critically
evaluating the state's educational message.1 12  Moreover, the public school envi-
ronment traditionally has rewarded compliance and conformity, encouraging ac-
ceptance of educational messages from authority figures. In such an atmosphere,
the courts must be sensitive to efforts by students, parents, and teachers to pre-
vent abuse of the state's extraordinary "power ... to persuade." 113 Explicit
judicial recognition of the public school student's right to receive educational
information would considerably diminish the potential for such abuse.
C. The Teacher's Rights in the Public School Classroom
The public school teacher who wishes to challenge school board regulation
of classroom discussions and materials can assert a two-faceted first amendment
right against the state." 4  First, like any other individual, the teacher has a
personal right of free expression that is not shed "at the schoolhouse gate." 113
guarantees"). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that all children, not only those in a public
school classroom, might be characterized as a captive audience. See Program Content, supra note 78,
at 1381-82.
110. See generally Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53
Colum. L. Rev. 960, 963-64 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Black, Captive Auditor]; Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302, 308 (1974); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 466 (Black, J., concurring in part).
I ll. See also notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra.
112. As one commentator has noted, "'[glovernment broadcasting to a captive audience on a
bus is not very different from government broadcasting to school children, except that silence is an
available alternative only in the first situation." See Garvey, First Amendment, supra note 31, at 369
(referring to Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)). It is important to remember,
however, that in schoolbook conflicts, the plaintiffs, rather than demanding restriction of expression,
often are attempting to compel expression in the form of books or materials that have been denied to
them.
113. See Yudof, supra note 92, at 874-75.
114. The teacher's freedom of instructional expression may be described as twin rights: a
"speech" right and a "structural" right. Cf. Brennan, Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176-77
(1979) (articulating two models of first amendment protection for the press: (1) a "speech" model
under which the press has the right to speak out and (2) a "structural" model that focuses on the role
of the press as provider and circulator of the information necessary for informed public discussion).
The teacher's "speech" right to free expression is personal-a right to self-expression that
flows from the individualist values inherent in the first amendment. The "structural" right is instru-
mental, flowing from the utilitarian value of an educated citizenry. See Section III. A. supra. This
structural right is the complement to the student's right to receive information and is, arguably, the
more important of the two. When a teacher is silenced, the students may never receive the restricted
information. Their injury is not known to them and, not knowing of the deprivation, they are not
likely to seek to correct it. The teacher's institutional expertise thus makes him or her the appropriate
champion of the child's right to receive information. See note 117 infra.
115. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. at 506. Justice Fortas's dictum about
teachers' rights, id., prompted Justice Black to respond, in dissent, that a teacher "no more carries
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Although a state employee, the public school teacher retains first amendment
protection against excessive state regulation of noninstructional expression." 6 In
addition, the teacher has a discrete first amendment right not to be compelled to
infringe his or her students' first amendment right to receive information."17
Difficult problems arise in attempting to reconcile these rights with the
legitimate educational interests of the state in disputes over the content of in-
struction, where the state's interests are strongest. In Epperson V. Arkansas, "
the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of state control of instructional content
when it invalidated Arkansas's anti-evolution statute on the ground that it vio-
lated the first amendment's establishment clause. The Court addressed the issue
of curriculum and state control of the content of a teacher's classroom expression
only in dictum." 9
In one recent case, Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper, 120 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly held that the content of a
teacher's classroom discussion is protected by the first amendment. The teacher,
who used role-playing in her presentation of Reconstruction-era history, was not
rehired after she refused " 'not to discuss Blacks in American history' " and did
not eliminate everything "controversial" from classroom discussions.' 2' The
Fifth Circuit ordered her reinstated with back pay, holding that "classroom dis-
into school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than ... [any other
employee of an institution does to act] contrary to [its] rules and speak his mind on any subject he
pleases.... [A] teacher is not paid to go into school and teach subjects the State does not hire him to
teach as a part of its selected curriculum." Id. at 521-22. But see note 116 infra.
116. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School, 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (teacher
cannot be terminated because of private expression of opinion to school principal); Mount Healthy
City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (where school board claims mixed motives, it
must show that nontenured teacher was not rehired for reasons other than exercise of first amendment
freedom outside of classroom); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (teacher
has first amendment right to refuse to participate in flag salute), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
117. Academic Freedom, supra note 89, at 725.
Whether a teacher has standing to assert a student's right to receive information has not yet been
decided by the Supreme Court, and lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions. In Mercer v.
Michigan State.Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974),
the district court refused to grant a teacher third-party standing to sue on behalf of his students and
their parents, finding that the students and parents could have asserted their rights themselves and
that the court would not easily be able to determine whether any parents or students desired a change
in the challenged statute.
Mercer's viability has been cast in doubt by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the
Supreme Court recognized the third-party standing of one who was legally obliged to engage in
conduct that would "result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights." Id. at 195 (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975)). Thus, when a teacher has been compelled to implement
school policies that may unconstitutionally infringe the first amendment rights of students, courts
should recognize his or her standing to bring the claim. See generally Note, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423 (1974).
118. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See notes 64-70 and accompanying text supra. See also T. Emerson,
supra note 41, at 605-07.
119. See 393 U.S. at 104-05.
120. 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 1111, quoting school district's personnel director. After she completed the unit, the
school board decided not to renew her contract despite the strong recommendations of her principal
and the school superintendent.
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cussion is protected activity" and that the board's actions violated her first
amendment rights.
122
The Kingsville court, acknowledging that first amendment protection must
be qualified in the classroom context, concluded that such discussions are pro-
tected unless they " 'clearly .. .overbalance [the teacher's] usefulness as an
instructor.' " 123
This standard appears to give inadequate deference to the school board's
authority over curriculum: the board is entitled to use reasonable judgment in
evaluating the relative educational advantages and disadvantages not only of
overall performance, but also of a teacher's approach to particular subjects-" 4
Too much deference to the teacher could lead to interference with the school's
effort to transmit legitimate values and ideals to its students. For example, the
teacher is not free to decide unilaterally to omit some portions of the prescribed
curriculum. In Palmer v. Board of Education, 125 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a probationary kindergarten teacher who was a
Jehovah's Witness was not free to disregard the prescribed curriculum regarding
patriotic matters despite her claim that participation would violate her religious
beliefs. The court noted the compelling parental and state interests in having
democratically chosen representatives select the curriculum, and concluded that
"[i]t cannot be left to individual teachers to teach what they please." 126
122. Id. at 1113. Of course, the texts may have included a comprehensive representation of the
material, in which case there was, if anything, less reason to impose sanctions on the teacher's
classroom discussions. If the books themselves omitted this significant material, the first amendment
should protect the teacher's right to distribute appropriate material to fill the gap, as well as the
student's right to receive it.
123. 611 F.2d at 1113 (quoting Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's University, 509 F.2d 133, 139
(5th Cir. 1975)).
124. Any other result would assure a teacher the right to continue to be useless, or even disrup-
tive, in one subject area if his or her overall performance was more useful than not.
Courts sometimes prefer to decide these cases in whole or in part on' procedural due process
grounds, focusing on inadequate guidelines and lack of notice to the teachers being disciplined. See,
e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), on remand, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). As Kingsville indicates, these cases can be viewed
through a first amendment, as well as a due process, prism. To the extent that established educational
policy does not constrain the teacher's choice, he or she enjoys discretion to make first-line educa-
tional decisions without fear of loss of, or suspension from, employment. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323
F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971).
Although the courts in Keefe and Parducci emphasized the lack of adequate notice, in both cases
the teachers had been instructed not to continue the activities in question, and no action was taken
against them until they expressly refused to follow such instructions. See Keefe, 418 F.2d at 361;
Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 354. While the courts in these cases may simply have avoided making
hard decisions, it may be that broader concerns than the absence of fair notice explain these rulings.
In particular, first amendment considerations suggest that if the school authorities are unable to show
a reasonable educational basis for their prohibition, the teacher's choice of methods or materials
should be respected. See Section IV infra. See also Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973,
991-92 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
125. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
126. Id. at 1274.
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The teacher, then, is required to adhere to the general curriculum, to pre-
pare and select relevant materials 127 reasonably tailored to the age and sophisti-
cation of the class,1 2 8 and to use methods that appropriately maintain discipline
in the classroom. 129  A teacher who fails to meet these conditions and who has
adequate notice of the consequences may justifiably be discharged.
The state's power to supervise instructional content, as reflected in these
requirements, is warranted as a check on the autonomous teacher's considerable
power over students 130-power that brings both benefit and danger into the
classroom. Unfortunately, courts have tended to focus only on the danger to the
exclusion of the benefit. The teacher's autonomy is more often an insulator
against ideological bombardment than it is a danger. As long as all teachers
retain the right to express independent views in the classroom, the state is unable
to speak with a single voice.' 31
127. Relevance is not always self-evident. While it is clear that a science teacher is hired to
teach science, not history, see, e.g., Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.
Mo. 1972); Ahem v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th
Cir. 1972), determinations of relevancy are issues of fact that the teacher is often required to prove.
See, e.g., Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
965 (1975) (teachers unsuccessfully attempted to show by expert testimony that Woodstock brochures
were relevant and of educational value). But see id. at 991 (dissenting view that material was neither
"so irrelevant to educational goals [nor so] patently offensive that the plaintiffs were precluded from
exercising their judgment as teachers and electing to employ it in their classes"). Indeed, even
demonstrably relevant expression may be restricted if there are valid educational justifications for
imposing restraint. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
128. The "age and sophistication" requirement seems as much a question of common sense as
of pedagogical theory. A younger child is generally more impressionable than an older child who has
had time to develop critical and analytical skills. See Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973,
976, 985 (7th Cir. 1974) (poem about free love and drugs too controversial for eighth-grade stu-
dents), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969)
(class discussion of assignment containing word "motherfucker" not too great a shock for high
school seniors to stand). Sophistication does not always follow chronological age and might vary
depending on geography and local custom. The teacher must thus be sensitive to the particular
capabilities and sensibilities of the students in his or her charge.
See also Kamenshine, supra note 35, at 1134 (reaching the seemingly anomalous result that it is
acceptable to instill patriotic sentiments in very young school children, whereas junior or senior high
school students must be shielded from indoctrination because they are mature enough to understand
but lack the sophistication to be skeptical).
129. Concern for maintenance of discipline is a factor bearing on students' right to receive
information, see note 97 and accompanying text supra, but it also arises in the context of teachers'
activities. See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 932 (1973); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
In this connection, the courts look not to the form of expression but to its impact on the school.
See Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp. 613, 622 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (teacher's exhor-
tation to students caused the "disruptions of the orderly and disciplined operation of the school").
130. See Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 855-58; Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at
1345; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493
(1952). See also James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
131. See Yudof, supra note 92, at 876-77:
The greater the ability of the school system to control what goes on in every classroom, the
greater the danger of its promulgating a uniform message to its captive listeners.... [Jlust
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Thus, the teacher's right to free expression requires the same balancing of
first amendment freedoms against majoritarian educational values necessary in
the analysis of the student's right to know. Accordingly, the same standard of
judicial review is applicable in both contexts. The remainder of this Note de-
velops an approach for the balancing of these interests.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING SCHOOLBOOK CONTROVERSIES
The process of selection and removal of public school text and library books
by school boards generates feelings powerful enough to tear communities
apart. 132  The courts are struggling to reconcile the substantial constitutional
claims of the parties to the conflict; to date, however, their attempts to accom-
modate the clashing concerns of states, parents, teachers, and students have pro-
duced no analysis capable of resolving the disputes. Before a satisfactory resolu-
tion can emerge, it is necessary to identify and address directly the latent tension
between the first amendment values discussed above and the particular charac-
teristics of the public school context.
A. Public School Decisionmaking: The Standard of Review
Any reasonable approach to schoolbook controversies must begin with rec-
ognition of the inevitable tension between basic first amendment values and
legitimate majoritarian control over public education. While the public schools
are not constitutionally prohibited from espousing particular viewpoints or from
engaging in social and civil indoctrination, they may not transgress the Constitu-
tion's limits on infringement of free speech and expression. It seems clear that
the states themselves may not determine where those limits lie; 133 that responsi-
bility must rest with the courts.
134
as the balkanization of responsibility for education among governments reduces the poten-
tial danger of a thorough indoctrination, the autonomy of the classroom teacher diminishes
the power of government to work its will through communication.
132. See Schember, Textbook Censorship-the Validity of School Board Rules, 28 Ad. L.
Rev. 259, 259 (1976) (outbreaks of violence in Kanawha County, West Virginia, after new textbooks
were ordered that local community believed would "demean, encourage skepticism, or foster disbe-
lief in the institutions of the United States of America and in Western civilization"). See also Mur-
ph , The Meaning of Freedom of Speech: First Amendment Freedoms from Wilson to FDR 208-10
(1972); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 706-10 (D. Mass.
1978).
133. Cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 201 ("If the constitutional principle, for example, is that the
state may regulate X, the principle can become illusory if the state is left free to define X as it
will.").
134. It has been suggested that, whenever a first amendment claim is raised, only a judicial,
rather than an administrative, determination "in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sen-
sitivity to freedom of expression ...." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See also
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 524 (1970) ("Courts alone are
institutionally able consistently to discern, and to apply, the values embodied in the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.").
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The inherent tension between respecting democratic control of the schools
and protecting freedom of thought and expression within them is typical of what
one commentator has described as "the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy
in a democratic society." 135 The ideal of democratic governance is the legisla-
tive implementation of "popular sovereignty," 136 and the courts should refrain
from disturbing this process unless there are compelling reasons "to regard the
question at hand as appropriately committed to anti-majoritarian resolution." 137
This dilemma is particularly acute in the case of first amendment review, be-
cause the amendment itself exalts both the ideals of democratic self-government
by majority rule and the vindication of the minority's right to disagree. 13 8 But
despite the difficulty, the courts must undertake the task of patrolling the line
between reasonable majoritarian education 139 and abuses of discretion that may
undermine the first amendment rights of parents, teachers, and students. 140 If,
in fact, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools" 141 and the first amendment
"does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," 142 the
courts must safeguard the essential precondition of enlightened democracy: an
educated citizenry.
135. Bork, supra note 46, at 2. See also id. at 3:
There are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it
decides to do them.... [For this reason] [s]ociety consents to be ruled undemocratically
[i.e., by judicial review] within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be
stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.
See also A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1962) ("The root difficulty is that judicial
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.").
136. Commercial Speech, supra note 45, at 6-7.
137. Id. at 7.
138. See Wellington, supra note 43, at 1137-38 & nn.130-40; BeVier, supra note 46, at 313.
139. The courts are not educators and their intervention should be limited to the correction of
clear abuses by school boards. It is important to remember, however, that many local school boards,
unlike some administrative agencies, are composed of civically responsible local citizens having no
particular educational expertise. There is, then, no compelling reason always to defer to their nonex-
pert educational judgments. Moreover, administrative law principles make clear that even expert
bodies are not beyond review. See generally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action
(1965). The mere knowledge that their policies are subject to review may, in fact, encourage reason-
ableness and flexibility on the part of local boards and "combat any imposition of monolithic, au-
thoritarian standards on children." Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children,
39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 118, 132 (1975).
140. It is not a complete answer to suggest that those parents and teachers who object to school
board policies enroll their children and seek employment in private schools. Parents and teachers
cannot dictate educational policy to the state, but the state may not condition receipt of its
benefits-i.e., access to and employment in its schools-on acquiescence in the violation of con-
stitutional rights. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state qannot condition unemployment
benefits on willingness to work on Saturdays in violation of Sabbath observance). See also Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). But see Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1448
(1968) ("The basic flaw in the doctrine [of unconstitutional conditions] is its assumption that the
same evil results from attaching certain conditions to government-connected activity as from impos-
ing such conditions on persons not connected with government.").
141. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US.
479, 487 (1960)).
142. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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To do so, they must apply a standard of review sufficiently deferential to
the school board to protect community interests, and yet rigorous enough to
protect freedom of expression. One such standard is a test requiring that
"reasonable educational judgment" underlie schoolbook decisions made by
school boards.
This concept of reasonable educational judgment incorporates the spectrum
of factors involved in school board decisionmaking. It encompasses all the prac-
tical considerations that inform decisions at the initial acquisition stage, including
financial constraints, space limitations, curricular priorities, duplication of re-
sources, relevance and timeliness of subject matter, scholarship, relative educa-
tional impact, and appropriateness to the age of the student body. A school
board is virtually certain to consider several of these factors in making the initial
decision whether to purchase a book or include it in the curriculum, 143 and no
board basing decisions on such considerations alone should be held to have acted
in violation of the Constitution.
As noted earlier, reasonable educational policy may also encompass some
degree of indoctrination by persuasion. 1 44  School boards may seek to promote
certain social and political values through the selection and rejection of school-
books. But a school board's decision to regulate student access to books and the
information they contain must at all times be governed by legitimate educational
concerns.
Thus, to withstand first amendment review, a schoolbook purchase decision
may take account of the pragmatic realities of the school's needs and resources
and be responsive to community values and goals, but it must fall within the
range of reasonableness established by the professional educational community,
and serve educational purposes in the manner least restrictive of the teachers'
and students' respective rights to convey and receive information. Adherence to
such a standard of decisionmaking would leave the school board with substantial
discretion to make its selections while affording students and teachers protection
from unjustified infringements of their first amendment rights. However, a
somewhat different treatment may be warranted for book removal decisions.
143. Regular book selection procedures with prescribed guidelines would help to establish the
reasonableness of the board's educational policy. Although the statutes conferring the power to select
books are often framed in general terms, see, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir.
1979) (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109 (1973)), and do not require the promulgation of regulations,
when such regulations exist and are followed the courts may take them into consideration as evidence
from which the absence of arbitrariness may be inferred. Conversely, where the board has established
routine procedures, deviations from them may create suspicion of impropriety in the decisionmaking
process. Compare Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979) (school
board's cancellation of magazine without following established procedures; court ordered board to
resubscribe upon showing that board members were attempting to censor political content), with Cary
v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979) (board's failure to adhere to procedure and
explain its decision to exclude ten books overlooked where parties stipulated no attempt "to exclude
any particular type of thinking or book"). But see Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of
Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979) (liberal language of school board's library policy does not
enlarge scope of plaintiff student's "right to read" or "right to access"), appeal pending, No.
79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980).
144. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Distinguishing Book Selection from Book Removal
The courts are most sharply divided over the appropriate analysis for
school board decisions to remove books already selected for library or classroom
use. In Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board, 4 the Sec-
ond Circuit equated the "shelving [and] unshelving of books" and found no
constitutional issue in either situation. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School
District, 146 however, the Sixth Circuit did distinguish book selection from book
removal, although it failed to articulate its reasons for doing so. 147 The distinc-
tion appears valid: while the substantive issues are the same-school board regu-
lation of expression through schoolbook policy and its impact on the student's
right to receive information-the risk of unconstitutional action is considerably
greater at the removal stage.
148
When a school board, or other authorized educational decisionmaker, 14 1
selects a book for its collection, it has the opportunity to consider such factors as
the book's scholarship, instructional value, subject matter, relevance, interest,
and appropriateness to the age of the student body. In reaching a decision, it
balances these factors against available funds and shelf space and competing
priorities. On the other hand, when a decisionmaker removes a book from circu-
lation, it is in effect overriding the prior educational judgment that led to its
acquisition and shelving. The fact of this earlier educational evaluation gives rise
to a presumption when the same book is removed that other, noneducational
considerations have come into play. Once the priorities have been ordered, the
money spent, and the book shelved, there is an increased likelihood of uncon-
stitutional decisionmaking. 150
Thus, while book removal and acquisition decisions should be subject to the
same constitutional standard of reasonable educational judgment, different pre-
sumptions may be appropriate. Initial acquisition decisions "' by authorized edu-
cational decisionmakers in accordance with regular procedures may properly be
regarded as presumptively constitutional. Accordingly, when plaintiffs challenge
a school board's initial decision not to purchase a book, they bear the burden of
showing that the decision was not prompted by reasonable educational judgment.
Recognition of this presumption in favor of the state serves to minimize
judicial intervention in school board decisionmaking. It is appropriate not only
because the initial educational decisionmaker may be presumed to have acted
145. 457 F.2d 289, 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See also Pico v. Board of
Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal pending, No. 79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980).
146. 541 F.2d 577, 581-83 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 710-11 (D. Mass. 1978).
147. See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra.
148. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text infra.
149. The relevant decisionmaker may be the board, a teacher acting not in contravention of
established policy, librarian, library committee, textbook committee, etc.
150. See Comment, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 511, 520-21 (1977).
151. By this standard, book removal is a subsequent, not an initial, determination with regard to
any particular volume. However, where a properly defined prohibitive policy exists, such as the
exclusion of all discussion of a particular subject matter, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,




properly, 15 2 and because improper motivations at the initial stage are extremely
difficult to detect, 153 but also because the school and its agents are the preferred
sources of educational policy. 154 Thus, the school board need not justify its
initial schoolbook decisions unless the challenging party can come forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of an educationally proper mo-
tive. 155
A teacher acting not in contravention of an initial school board decision
should enjoy the benefit of the same presumption if the school board seeks to
interfere with his or her initial schoolbook decision. In such a case, the board
would bear the burden of demonstrating that its decision is based on a reasonable
educational policy.
156
Since the presumption of constitutionality attaches to the original decision,
the school board stands in a different position when it seeks to remove a book.
Any conflicts at the initial stage were presumably resolved in favor of inclusion
by some person authorized to make such determinations. It seems reasonable,
therefore, to recognize that there is a significantly greater risk that removal of
the books is unconstitutionally motivated. 157  The initial decision should be pro-
tected by the proposed presumption of educational validity, and the school board
desiring removal of a book should bear the burden, in accordance with usual first
amendment practice, of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that
its action is the result of a reasonable educational policy determination. Such an
approach should prove a disincentive to arbitrary and unconstitutional removal
decisions since the board must, if challenged, be prepared to persuade the trier
of fact that its action was based on a legitimate educational consideration. Thus
in all cases the standard of review is the presence or absence of a reasonable
educational policy underlying the school board's schoolbook decisions, and the
burden of proof is on the party challenging the initial educational determination.
152. An analogy may be drawn to the presumption that public officers acting in their official
capacity do so legally and in a regular manner. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence
807 (2d ed. 1972).
153. Id. See also Garvey, First Amendment, supra note 31, at 372; Goldstein, Asserted Right,
supra note 38, at 1349 n.183.
154. See generally Section II, and notes 108 & 139 supra.
155. Cf. Cruz v. Beto, 603 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff has burden of proving absence
of prison director's good faith in order to pierce his qualified immunity to suits for damages).
Evidence rebutting the presumption of validity may take a variety of forms, ranging from a
specific record of improper motivation with respect to an individual book to an official statement of
general policy or a pattern of decisions explicable only by the presence of impermissible considera-
tions. Cf. Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney,
79 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1395 (1979) ("With ... a pattern of activity [extending over time] to
review, a court could legitimately place emphasis on the number of foreseeably segregative choices
made: the cumulative results of many independent school board decisions can present a reasonably
accurate indication of what the institution as a whole is up to.") (referring to proof of discriminatory
purpose in school desegregation cases) (emphasis added).
156. For an illustration, see text accompanying notes 158-59.
157. This approach is further justified by traditional first amendment analysis with regard to
willing and unwilling speakers. The state's silencing of a "willing speaker" on the basis of
content-in this case a book-is inherently suspect, whereas the state's own refusal to speak at all
typically has not been viewed as raising a first amendment issue. See notes 98-99 and accompanying
text supra. The refusal to buy a book may be analogized to the refusal to speak.
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C. Seven Illustrative Cases
1. School Board Refusal to Permit Use of Teacher-Furnished Materials. A
high school social studies teacher wants to discuss the controversial subjects of
American race relations and United States participation in the Vietnam con-
flict. 158  Both clearly fall within the rough outlines of "current events" and
"social studies" established by the curriculum. In support of her class discus-
sions, she distributes reprints of literature not in the school library collection.
These materials, which are not proscribed by any existing school board policy,
explore views on these topics differing from those in the authorized social
studies textbook. A number of parents then complain to the school board about
the views their children are bringing home, and the school board responds by
directing the teacher to alter her presentation. Resisting what she regards to be
unconstitutional censorship, the teacher seeks to enjoin the board from restricting
her presentation of alternative views. The board claims that its authority to con-
trol the curriculum includes the power to prohibit use of any disfavored mate-
rials.
In this case, the teacher is the first-line educator hired and licensed by the
state to implement the curriculum, and her distributions did not contravene estab-
lished school board policy. Hers is therefore the initial determination, and is
entitled to the presumption of constitutionality accorded to such determinations.
The presumption, of course, is not conclusive; the board will prevail if it can
meet its burden of demonstrating a reasonable educational policy for barring her
supplemental material.' 1:' To make this showing, the board cannot simply rest
on its superior position in the educational hierarchy, nor can it assert that it was
merely deferring to parental wishes. Instead, the board must demonstrate that a
reasonable body of professional educational opinion regards the teaching of a
"negative" view of American race relations and involvement in the Vietnam
conflict as unsuitable for high school students. Such a showing establishes a
constitutionally acceptable motivation for content discrimination. Since the Con-
158. This hypothetical case is loosely based on Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 376
F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1974). The teacher challenged his dismissal by the school board, and the district court, although it
did not order actual reinstatement, found that the teacher had been dismissed without adequate notice.
The court reached its conclusion after determining that the teacher's conduct served a "dem-
onstrated educational purpose," stating that "[t]he freedom of speech of a teacher and a citizen of
the United States must not be so lightly regarded that he stands in jeopardy of dismissal for raising
controversial issues in an eager but disciplined classroom." 376 F. Supp. at 661-62. Although this
language seems to suggest that a board may not contravene the reasonable instructional choices of a
teacher, a better view is that in the absence of a reasonable, constitutional prohibitive policy, no
teacher can be dismissed for exercising sound educational judgment. If such a prohibitive policy
exists and the teacher deliberately violates it, however reasonable the proscribed behavior, the board
may discipline the teacher without running afoul of the first amendment. See also Kingsville Indep.
School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (1980) (teacher's classroom discussion of controversial as-
pects of Reconstruction era); notes 120-24 and accompanying text supra.
159. Thus, if the board can show that the teacher used materials that were irrelevant or inap-
propriate to the age of the students, or attempted to proselytize in the classroom, the trier of fact
would be justified in finding that the board's restriction was merely an implementation of legitimate




stitution is not offended by decisions grounded in reasonable educational policy,
the dispute between a teacher and a properly motivated board must be resolved
in favor of the latter's superior authority, by virtue of state law, over education
in the public school.
2. School Board Refusal to Approve Teacher Requisition of New Course
Books. Another teacher, attempting to present an alternative view of current
events to his high school class, requisitions a new set of schoolbooks, and the
school board refuses to authorize the purchase. When the teacher goes to court
seeking to require the board to purchase the books requested, the board's refusal
should enjoy presumptive educational validity. In this case, the teacher bears the
burden of proving the absence of a reasonable educational policy underlying the
board's decision. 
160
If the teacher is able to show that the board's refusal is not prompted by
educational concerns, the court may compel the board to act constitutionally by
correcting the imbalance of curricular subject matter. But even when the teacher
successfully carries this burden, it is not clear that the court can require the
school board to purchase any specific volume. The Constitution may require that
the board protect the student's right to receive information unless there is educa-
tional justification for the omission but it does not mandate the manner in which
the board corrects an imbalance. The board may be able to meet the constitu-
tional requirement without expending funds, 161 or, if materials must be pur-
chased, the board may reasonably conclude that other books will better serve the
constitutional interests at stake.
3. School Board Removal of Teacher-Assigned Materials from School Li-
brary Shelves. Yet another teacher attempts to correct an unbalanced approach
toward race relations or the Vietnam conflict in the required social studies
textbook by making reading assignments from a book in the school library.
Bombarded by parental complaints about the "radical" opinions to which their
children have been exposed, the school authorities remove the offending volume
from the library. The teacher then goes to court seeking its reinstatement.
16 2
A book included in a school library collection has already been approved by
an authorized educational decisionmaker, whether that board or its predecessor or
the school librarians. The court may therefore presume that its inclusion was
based on reasonable educational judgment and place the burden of proof on the
160. Although this would be a heavy burden, it is not an impossible one. The teacher could, for
example, show a pattern or practice of rejections of such materials, while other books presenting one
side of a controversial issue within the curricular subject matter have been routinely approved.
161. For example, the teacher could lead in-class discussions, supplemented by materials she
has prepared or by assigning outside reading.
162. If school officials in Arkansas had attempted to destroy all volumes containing material
about evolution, after the Epperson decision, see text accompanying notes 64-69 supra, they probably
would have been enjoined from doing so. Such action would have been prima facie evidence of an
intent to perpetuate the unconstitutional policy. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526, 539-40 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 456-58 & n.7 (1979). See
also Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (in light of legislative history
favoring racial segregation, committee which rejected school history text on basis of racial content
deprived authors, teachers, and students of their first and fourteenth amendment rights).
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objecting board to show an educational purpose for its removal. 163  It would not
be sufficient to argue that removal is necessary simply to open up shelf space for
new books. Whenever the removal of a particular book raises parental, teacher,
or student objection, the board's decision cannot be deemed content-neutral; a
book's removal must be justified in terms of reasonable educational policy re-
lated to the content of that particular book.
4. School Board Exclusion of Ten out of 1,285 Previously Used Books from
Elective-Course Reading Lists. A group of senior high school language arts
teachers seeks board approval of a list of 1,285 books for use in elective lan-
guage courses. The books had been used in the past and are still owned by the
school. The board of education approves all but ten of the books. The teachers
seek to enjoin the exclusion of the ten disfavored books. 164  At the trial, both
parties stipulate that the ten books are not obscene, that a "constitutionally
proper decision-maker" could choose to include them in the list, and that there
has been no attempt on the part of the board to exclude a "particular system of
thought or philosophy." 165
This case is considerably more difficult from the teachers' perspective than
the preceding hypothetical. On the one hand, the ten excluded books had been
previously selected and used by authorized educational decisionmakers, a deci-
sion presumably unchallenged in past years. This inclusion decision, then, enjoys
a presumption of educational validity that places the burden on the school board
to demonstrate its own reasonable educational purpose in excluding the volumes.
On the other hand, the first amendment does not require inclusion in a reading
list of every book that could be of conceivable value in a course. The school
board's cause is aided by the stipulation that it was not attempting to exclude
''any particular system of thought or philosophy," but it must still prove that
some reasonable educational purpose, such as inappropriateness to the age of
students of the language used, or the complexity and subtlety of the subject
163. In Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), see notes 2-6 and accompanying text supra, the school board argued
that restricting access to a book violated no constitutional rights, since the teachers were permitted to
discuss the subject matter and even the book itself in class, although they could not assign it to be
read. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in the case, Justice Douglas found this anomaly unac-
ceptable. He noted that the students "can do everything but read it. This in my mind lessens some-
what the contention that the subject matter of the book is not proper." 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972),
Justice Douglas seemed to anticipate the risk of abuse when one school board weeds the library
collection amassed by its predecessors. See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra. Yet his sugges-
tion that if a book's subject matter is proper it cannot be removed is not sound; the board may well
be able to demonstrate that its removal decision was motivated by a reasonable educational policy.
See also Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal pending, No.
79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980).
164. This hypothetical is derived from Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.
165. Id. at 542-43. Although the board decision at issue in Cary seems not unreasonable, since
no attempt was made to skew the presentation of ideas, the court gave insufficient weight to the
constitutionally relevant issue of the board's motivation. As the concurrence urged, "the exclusion of
books for secondary school students is not to be an arbitrary exclusion." Id. at 544. The "personal
predilections" of board members are improper-unconstitutional-grounds for exclusion of a book
unless those predilections coincide with some reasonable educational policy.
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matter, rather than personal dislike by the board members, prompted these par-
ticular exclusions.
5. Parental Objection to Teacher-Assigned Readings Approved by the
School Board. A senior high school student has been assigned Oliver Twist and
The Merchant of Venice for a required English course. 166 Her parents object to
these books because they contain stereotypical portraits of Jews that, it is as-
serted, may engender anti-Semitism in the community. The teacher is unwilling
to substitute other works by Dickens and Shakespeare, and the school board
supports the teacher's decision. The parents seek to enjoin the assignment of the
books.
Since the books in question have already been chosen by a first-line
educator, they enjoy a presumptive constitutional validity. The board's endorse-
ment of the teacher's assignments indicates its view that the use of these books
serves a legitimate educational goal. Consequently, the parents bear the consid-
erable burden of demonstrating that the use of these books advances no legiti-
mate educational purpose. 167  In this case, it is obvious that a high school
teacher's choice of these two classics is not educationally unreasonable, and that
the board acted properly in approving the choice.
168
For equally valid educational reasons, the board might also conclude that, in
the future, David Copperfield and Julius Caesar would be equally valuable and
less controversial for adolescent students who are more vulnerable than adults to
the suggestive power of stereotypes. 169 If the teacher were to challenge such a
decision, operating prospectively, the court should view the case in the same
light as it would a school board's, attempt to remove teacher-assigned materials
from the library shelf. The board would thus bear the burden of justification; in
this case, it seems likely that the board would be able to demonstrate a reason-
able educational basis for the decision.
6. Parental Veto of a Mature Minor's Access to a Restricted Book Shelf. A
seventeen-year-old high school senior wants to read a book that the school has
placed on a limited-access library shelf. The school is willing to lend the book to
the minor's parents directly, so that they can decide whether they want their
child to read it. The parents refuse to permit their child to read the book. The
child seeks to compel the school board to ignore the parental veto and lend her
the book.
166. This situation arose in Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344
(Sup. Ct. 1949). The court refused to order removal where no showing was made of deliberate intent
by the author to generate anti-Semitism among readers.
167. Parents, having chosen to send their child to public school, are entitled only to the board's
reasonable educational judgment. As long as the board continues to make its book decisions for
legitimate educational reasons, without attempting to coerce beliefs, infringe religious freedom, or
abridge the student's right to receive educational information, parents have no personal constitutional
right to require or prevent the use of any particular book. Their only recourse is to alternative
education, either private school or, under proper circumstances, instruction at home.
168. Of course, the teacher may not use the books to espouse anti-Semitism; indeed, he or she
might even be directed by responsible school authorities to discuss and counterbalance the social
misconceptions to which the parents object.
169. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that




The school board's judgment that this book is so controversial -in its ideas
or language or both-that it wishes to defer to the wishes of parents, should be
respected by the court. The rearing of children has always been viewed in this
country as a fundamental prerogative of parents. 170  When parents enroll their
child in the public school system, they implicitly waive this right to control the
child's environment during school hours, at least to the extent the school is
pursuing a legitimate educational program. 171  This "delegation" of decision-
making power is not irreversible, however, and the state may choose to restore a
portion of the responsibility to parents when it sees fit.17 2  Thus, it is really
parental authority that the student wishes to challenge. While there is ample
precedent for state intervention between parent and child when the state's interest
in the child's welfare is paramount, 1 73 when the harm is no greater than tolerat-
ing a waiting period before the child may read a particular book, state interven-
tion might inflict unjustifiable harm on family relationships.' 74
Of course, the state may not abdicate its educational responsibilities and use
this parental veto device to infringe indirectly the student's right to receive in-
formation or to impose orthodox beliefs. The burden, however, is on the student
to show that no reasonable educational concerns justify the abridgment of his or
her right to receive information by restricting access to the book.
7. The Student's Right to Receive Educational Information fron an Unwill-
ing Speaker. A family from the Deep South moves to a small New England
community, where the fifteen-year-old daughter enrolls in the local high school.
In history class she studies the Civil War and the Reconstruction era. The class
text portrays the North as a generous victor whose efforts to rebuild the nation
were thwarted by the venality of the South. The daughter's parents, deeply dis-
turbed, ask the teacher to supplement the text with materials concerning carpet-
bagging and the punitive measures directed against the southern states by the
post-war government. He refuses and the school board supports his decision. The
parents seek an injunction to compel the school to change its text on the grounds
that it distorts the subject matter and infringes the student's right to receive
information.
170. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The complex issue of parental substan-
tive due process interests in the rearing of their children is beyond the scope of this Note. For
interesting discussions of parental rights and state interests, see Burt, supra note 139; Garvey, Child,
Parent, State and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 769 (1978); Hirschoff, supra note 33; Moskowitz, supra note 33.
171. See, e.g., Sugarman & Kirp, Rethinking Collective Responsibility for Education, 39 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 144, 207-08 (1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 406 (D.N.H. 1974).
172. Cf. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 586 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd
mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (state "has the power to permit the parents to make the final decision
as to exactly which courses [in this case elective sex education courses] the child should take").
173. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976).
174. If the state wishes to allow "mature minors" to make their own book choices, it should do
so not on a case-by-case basis, but by legislation defining the age of maturity, in order to avoid
lawsuits between parent and child over the issue of maturity. Cf. Goldstein, Medical Care for the
Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645, 662-64 (1977).
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Because the school's selection of texts is presumed constitutional, the par-
ents bear the burden of showing that continued use of this text alone is educa-
tionally unreasonable at the high school level. The parents claim that the students
have the right to receive an accurate picture of this important period in the
nation's political and legal development-a right that the first amendment pro-
tects even when the state-speaker wishes to be silent.17 5 They will try to muster
expert testimony to support their contention that,the school's presentation does
not fall within the range of reasonableness for high school instruction in this
subject.
The parents seem unlikely to prevail in this instance. The "range of reason-
ableness" is very broad, and courts will intervene only where the school board
has egregiously violated acceptable standards of scholarship. The students have




Controversies over schoolbook policies have generated considerable litiga-
tion and the procession to the courthouse is likely to continue. What the public
schools teach their students is vitally important to each child's future and to the
well-being of society generally. Accordingly, the states wish to control the cur-
ricular content of public school instruction, and particularly the selection of
schoolbooks, without interference from local parents and students, or from
teachers. Moreover, if schools are to operate effectively, state and local boards
must be free to make and carry out educational policy, including decisions
whether or not to acquire or retain certain books for classroom and library use.
Nevertheless, public school regulation of educational expression places at risk
the first amendment value of an educated citizenry; while the state may educate
its young, it may not abrogate the first amendment rights of students and
teachers within its public schools.
The students' right to receive educational information and the teachers'
complementary right to impart it may not be infringed by arbitrary and unjus-
tified school board restrictions. Courts, thus far, have had difficulty striking the
precarious balance that honors majoritarian decisionmaking while preserving
these first amendment interests. This Note suggests that a challenged school
board action should be subjected to a test of educational reasonableness. In prac-
tice, this would allow school boards to exercise freely their discretion to select
and remove schoolbooks as long as their decisions are supported by legitimate
educational concerns. All initial schoolbook decisions-whether reached by a
175. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), suggests that under certain
circumstances this may be true. See notes 99 & 101-08 and accompanying text supra.
176. If the teacher chose to implement the parents' suggestion by distributing supplementary
materials, and the board objected, the burden would shift. To restrict the teacher's presentation, the
board would have to prove, that suppression of these materials was justified by reasonable educational
concerns.
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prior school board, a librarian, or a teacher acting not in contravention of estab-
lished educational policy-should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. The
burden of proving the absence of reasonable educational policy should therefore
fall on the challenger of an initial decision- whether student, parent, teacher, or
removing school board.
This proposed framework for judicial review would accord proper deference
to the school board as the preferred educational decisionmaker. At the same time
it would recognize the substantial first amendment interests at stake, and create
an avenue for relief from patent abuses of authority.
Aleta G. Estreicher
